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Value of Agreement in Decision Analysis: 
Concept, Measures and Application 
Tom Pape*1a 
 
a London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK 
  
Abstract: In multi-criteria decision analysis workshops, participants often appraise the options individually before dis-
cussing the scoring as a group. The individual appraisals lead to score ranges within which the group then seeks the 
necessary agreement to identify their preferred option. Preference programming enables some options to be identified as 
dominated even before the group agrees on a precise scoring for them. 
Workshop participants usually face time pressure to make a decision. Decision support can be provided by flagging op-
tions for which further agreement on their scores seems particularly valuable. By valuable, we mean the opportunity to 
identify other options as dominated (using preference programming) without having their precise scores agreed before-
hand. The present paper quantifies this Value of Agreement and extends the concept to portfolio decision analysis and 
criterion weights. The new concept is validated through a case study in recruitment. 
Keywords: Multi-criteria decision analysis, incomplete information, group decision support system, preference program-
ming, portfolio decision analysis, human resources 
 
1 Introduction  
Multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) often assesses options with an additive independent value func-
tion (Keeney & Raiffa 1976). The performance of each option	݅ ∈ ܫ is valued on each criterion ݆ ∈ ܬ 
along a 0–100 scale to obtain the value scores ݒ௜௝ (see Table 1 for symbols). While the value score for 
tangible criteria can often be derived from well-defined, marginal value functions, which map attribute 
levels to value scores (e.g. frequency of a service, horsepower of a machine, traffic noise), many intan-
gible criteria require highly subjective judgements to assign value scores to options (e.g. impact of con-
structions on scenery, level of expertise of organisation, comfort of vehicle) (Keeney 1982). The criteria 
are weighted against each other, leading to the relative importance judgements ݓ௝ with ∑ ݓ௝௝ ൌ 1. The 
decision model recommends the option with the greatest score ௜ܸ ൌ ∑ ݓ௝ݒ௜௝௝ . 
Real-world problems are rarely that simplistic, and extensions to the model are therefore required. The 
present paper addresses MCDA problems in which the score preferences are initially incomplete; i.e. 
the criterion scores can take any number in the range ሾݒ௜௝, ̅ݒ௜௝ሿ. The options’ value scores hence span 
from ௜ܸ ൌ ∑ ݓ௝ݒ௜௝௝  to തܸ௜ ൌ ∑ ݓ௝̅ݒ௜௝௝ . If there is one option that dominates all others, it is called the robust 
option (Roy 1998). 
Such incomplete preference information (Hazen 1986, Kirkwood & Sarin 1985, Sarin 1977) is often en-
countered by decision-making groups appraising options against intangible selection criteria. In multi-
criteria group decision making, participants frequently appraise the options individually before seeking 
agreement on the scores. The individual precise criterion scores ݒ௜௝௞ by participants ݇ ∈ ܭ lead to crite-
rion score ranges from ݒ௜௝ ൌ min௞ሼݒ௜௝௞ሽ to ̅ݒ௜௝ ൌ max௞ሼݒ௜௝௞ሽ, within which the group looks for the neces-
sary agreement to identify the group’s robust option. ‘Aggregation’ and ‘consensus’ are the two principle 
methods to reach this necessary agreement. Using the aggregation method, an influence weight is as-
signed to each participant (e.g. Dias & Sarabando 2012, Kim & Ahn 1999, Salo 1995). A precise group 
score for all decision options can be automatically calculated by weighting the individual scores, which 
immediately clarifies the group’s preferred option according to the participants’ influence. Using the 
consensus method, the group engages in a discussion from which the necessary consensus on the 
scores needs to emerge with mutual agreement (e.g. Dias & Climaco 2005, Matsatsinis & Samaras 
2001, Mustajoki et al. 2007, Phillips 2011, Shakhsi-Niaei et al. 2011, Vilkkumaa et al. 2014). The ag-
gregation method stresses the positional power of each decision maker, while the consensus method 
emphasises mutual learning from each other’s insights in the decision problem. When using the con-
sensus method, time pressure may make it challenging for the group to come to a full agreement on all 
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scores (Kim & Ahn 1997, Weber 1987). In this paper, 
we develop a new concept, which helps the consensus 
method in multi-criteria group decision-making to be 
more time-effective.  
When thoroughly reviewing the individual appraisals 
௜ܸ௞ ൌ ∑ ݓ௝ݒ௜௝௞௝  and the resulting score ranges from 
௜ܸ ൌ min௞ሼ ௜ܸ௞ሽ to തܸ௜ ൌ max௞ሼ ௜ܸ௞ሽ, a skilled facilitator 
might be able to roughly guess which options are defi-
nitely dominated, which options are likely to be domi-
nated after further agreement on some other options is 
sought, which ones have a totally unclear fate and 
which ones have a good chance of becoming the robust 
one. The present paper attempts to replace this intuitive 
guessing with a quantitative concept we call Value of 
Agreement. Options with a high Value of Agreement are 
more attractive to a group discussion as knowing their 
agreed value score may allow eliminating other options 
as dominated without the need to seek agreement on 
their scores beforehand; thus, finding the robust option 
will require less effort. Altogether, the Value of Agree-
ment estimates the impact of eliciting additional prefer-
ence information on the time requirements of a decision 
analysis workshop.  
Designing workshops to eliminate options quickly has 
hitherto been addressed only by very few publications. 
Hämäläinen & Pöyhönen (1996) and Salo & 
Hämäläinen (1995) analysed problems where only the 
weight information was incomplete. They suggested that 
the group should first seek agreement on the criteria 
with large weight ranges. Mustajoki & Hämäläinen 
(2005) and Mustajoki et al. (2007) provided decision aid 
to wisely choose the next swap in the MCDA method 
even swaps. Mustajoki et al. (2005) studied which crite-
rion should be used as the reference criterion for the 
weight elicitation to harness preference programming 
effectively. Liesiö et al. (2007, 2008) briefly examined the problem for portfolio decision analysis but 
only offered limited guidance for an option elicitation order.1 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses normative preference programming tech-
niques to identify definitely dominated options. Section 3 explains descriptive approaches developed by 
psychologists to predict on which precise scores ݒ௜௝∗  the group may finally agree. Section 4 pulls togeth-
er the normative and descriptive decision-making perspectives from the previous two sections and de-
velops a prescriptive measure for the Value of Agreement on option scores in MCDA. Section 5 modi-
fies this measure for multi-criteria portfolio decision analysis (PDA)—an important extension of MCDA. 
Section 6 adapts the Value of Agreement to weights. Section 7 demonstrates the effectiveness of the 
proposed measures with a computer simulation. Section 8 reports on the application of the Value of 
Agreement concept to a PDA-based recruitment selection problem using computer software. Section 9 
concludes with a research outlook. 
2 Preference programming 
Preference programming encompasses a set of techniques to eliminate definitely dominated options 
and ultimately identify the robust option given the incomplete information about scores and weights 
(Arbel 1989, Punkka & Salo 2013, Salo & Hämäläinen 1992, 2010). The expressed incomplete prefer-
ences are typically range-based or ordinal-based (e.g. Kirkwood & Sarin 1985, Liesiö et al. 2007, 
Punkka & Salo 2013). Preference programming is a normative approach that, in its original form, cap-
tures the incomplete information in a set of linear constraints. Non-dominated options can be easily 
identified by examining the extreme points of the resulting convex hull (e.g. Hazen 1986, Liesiö et al. 
Table 1 
Symbols. 
 
ܤ Budget
ܿ௜ Cost of option ݅ ߝ Tolerance value 
݅/ܫ Index/set of options 
݅∗ Robust option 
݆/ܬ Index/set of criteria 
݇/ܭ Index/set of assessors (workshop partici-
pants)
ߠ Parameter for social judgement scheme
߮/ ො߮ Value score of the robust option in the 
MCDA case; borderline value-for-money 
ratio in the PDA case; ො߮ is the heuristic 
choice for ߮ 
ݎ௜/ݎ௜∗ Value-for-money ratio of option ݅; ݎ௜∗ is 
the prediction for ݎ௜ ܵ௪ Set of extreme points of the convex hull 
of feasible weight combinations
ݒ௜௝/ݒ௜௝∗ /ݒ௜௝௔/ݒ௜௝௣ Value score of option ݅ for criterion ݆; ݒ௜௝∗ , ݒ௜௝௔  and ݒ௜௝௣  are, respectively, the predict-
ed, the actually agreed and the proposed 
value for ݒ௜௝ ݒ௜௝/̅ݒ௜௝ Lower/upper bound for ݒ௜௝ ݒ௜ᇲ௝#௜ /̅ݒ௜ᇲ௝#௜ Lower/upper bound for ݒ௜ᇲ௝ after assum-
ing that ݒ௜௝ takes its predicted value ݒ௜௝∗ݒ௜௝௞ Value for ݒ௜௝ assigned by assessor ݇
௜ܸ/ ௜ܸ∗/ ௜ܸ௔ Overall value score of option ݅; ௜ܸ∗ and ௜ܸ௔
are, respectively, the predicted and the 
actually agreed value for ௜ܸ 
௜ܸ/ തܸ௜ Lower/upper bound for ௜ܸ 
௜ܸᇲ
#௜/ തܸ௜ᇲ#௜ Lower/upper bound for ௜ܸᇲ after assuming 
that ௜ܸ takes its predicted value ௜ܸ∗
௜ܸ
#௝/ തܸ௜#௝ Lower/upper bound for ௜ܸ after assuming 
that ݓ௝ takes its predicted value ݓ௝∗
௜ܸ௞ Value for ௜ܸ assigned by assessor ݇ݓ௝/ݓ௝∗/ݓ௝௔ 0–1 normalised weight of criterion ݆; ݓ௝∗
and ݓ௝௔ are, respectively, the predicted 
and the actually agreed value for ݓ௝. A 
tilde ~ on top indicates that the weight is 
not normalised. 
ݓ௝௞ 0–1 normalised value for ݓ௝ assigned by 
assessor ݇. A tilde ~ on top indicates 
that the weight is not normalised.
ݓ௝/ݓഥ௝ 0–1 normalised lower/upper bound for ݓ௝. A tilde ~ on top indicates that the 
weight is not normalised. 
ݖ௜௝௞ Centrality position of group member ݇ for 
the assessment of score ݒ௜௝ according to 
the social judgement scheme 
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2007, White et al. 1984) or by solving 
mathematical programmes (e.g. Arbel & 
Vargas 1993, Lahdelma et al. 1998, 
Salo & Hämäläinen 1995). 
The range-based strict dominance rule 
(e.g. Hazen 1986) 
݅ଵ ≻ ݅ଶ ⇔ ௜ܸభ ൒ തܸ௜మ		and		 തܸ௜భ ൐ തܸ௜మ 
is a logic based on preference ranges 
which can be applied in a basic MCDA problem where just the score information is incomplete. For the 
robust option ݅∗, the strict preference ݅∗ ≻ ݅ must hold for all ݅ ∈ ܫ\ሼ݅∗ሽ.2  
An ordinal-based weak dominance rule can be constructed by considering participants’ implicit rankings 
when assigning scores to options. Option ݅ଵ weakly dominates option ݅ଶ on criterion ݆ if all participants ݇ 
believe that ݒ௜భ௝௞ ൒ ݒ௜మ௝௞. In this case, the linear constraint ݒ௜భ௝ ൒ ݒ௜మ௝ can be added to the preference 
programme. Option ݅ଵ weakly dominates options ݅ଶ overall if all participants ݇ believe that ௜ܸభ௞ ൌ∑ ݓ௝ݒ௜భ௝௞௝ ൒ ∑ ݓ௝ݒ௜మ௝௞௝ ൌ ௜ܸమ௞. In this case, the linear constraint ∑ ݓ௝ݒ௜భ	௝௝ ൒ ∑ ݓ௝ݒ௜మ	௝௝  can be added to 
the preference programme. Moreover, assume there is already a group agreement that ݒ௜భ௝ ൒ ݒ௜మ௝. In 
this condition, learning that the group agreed on the precise number ݒ௜భ௝௔  (ݒ௜మ௝௔ ሻ for the score ݒ௜భ௝ (ݒ௜మ௝) 
may allow for tightening the upper (lower) bound such that ̅ݒ௜మ௝ ≔ minሼݒ௜భ௝௔ , ̅ݒ௜మ௝ሽ (ݒ௜భ௝ ≔ maxሼݒ௜భ௝, ݒ௜మ௝௔ ሽ). 
The same tightening rule can be used for option scores. If there is a group consensus on ௜ܸభ ൒ ௜ܸమ and 
the participants agree on the precise option score ௜ܸభ
௔ ( ௜ܸమ
௔), the upper (lower) bound for ௜ܸమ ( ௜ܸభ) can be 
updated to തܸ௜మ௝ ≔ minሼ ௜ܸభ௝௔ , തܸ௜మሽ ( ௜ܸభ ≔ maxሼ ௜ܸభ, ௜ܸమ௔ሽ). 
3 Predicting agreement 
The group’s actual agreement on a precise number ݒ௜௝௔  for a score ݒ௜௝ can be predicted when all group 
members have already made their individual appraisals ݒ௞௜௝. Next, we distinguish between the case in 
which the participants only know the single appraisals ݒ௞௜௝ or their ranges ሾݒ௜௝, ̅ݒ௜௝ሿ (section 3.1) and the 
case in which an aggregate of their appraisals such as the mean or the median is presented to the par-
ticipants (section 3.2). 
3.1 Social judgement scheme 
The social decision scheme (Davis 1973) has led to much insight into how small groups arrive from in-
dividual preference statements to a group decision along a discrete scale of measurement (Parks & 
Kerr 1999). A major finding of this research stream is that individuals whose preferences are quite simi-
lar to those of other group members wield an exponentially greater influence on the final decision than 
those individuals with extreme preferences. Davis (1996) manifests this observation in the equations of 
his social judgement scheme (SJS)—a continuous generalisation of the discrete social decision 
scheme.  
ݖ௞௜௝ denotes the SJS centrality position of group member ݇ for the assessment of score ݒ௜௝ and is de-
fined as 
ݖ௜௝௞ ൌ
∑ ݁ିఏห௩೔ೕೖି௩೔ೕ೗ห|௄|௟ୀଵ,௞ஷ௟
∑ ∑ ݁ିఏห௩೔ೕ೓ି௩೔ೕ೗ห|௄|௟ୀଵ,௛ஷ௟|௄|௛ୀଵ
		 , ߠ ൌ 1.	
ݖ௜௝௞ can be interpreted as the percentage of influence of assessor ݇ on the group’s collective choice for ݒ௜௝. ݒ௜௝∗ ൌ ∑ݖ௜௝௞ݒ௜௝௞ is the most central value for ݒ௜௝ according to SJS, and thus a good point estimator of 
the group’s unknown actual agreement ݒ௜௝௔ . Fig. 1 exhibits an example where the point estimator ݒ௜௝∗ 	is 
derived from individual appraisals using three common aggregates and SJS. 
Wide research on the social decision scheme provides a solid theoretical foundation for the centrality 
position approach. Furthermore, experiments by Bonner et al. (2004), Davis et al. (1997), Nadler et al. 
(2001) and Ohtsubo et al. (2002) offer good evidence in favour of SJS. Applications of SJS in decision 
support systems for MCDA workshops can be found in the studies conducted by Rigopoulos (2008), 
Tsiporkova & Boeva (2006) and Tundjungsari et al. (2012). It is important to also highlight that SJS 
shares the property of heavily discounting extreme opinions with the geometric mean as the consensus 
estimator. While there are many case studies that use the geometric mean in group decision problems 
modelled as Analytical Hierarchy Process (e.g. Saaty & Vargas 2001, Vaidya & Kumar 2006), we are 
not aware of any research that validates the geometric mean as an appropriate consensus estimator. 
Fig. 1. Example of |ܭ| ൌ 8 individual appraisals ݒ௜௝௞ with corresponding SJS
centrality positions ݖ௜௝௞ and predicted agreement ݒ௜௝௞∗  according to the geo-
metric mean, the arithmetic mean, the median and SJS. 
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provides a first measure for the Value of Agreement for option ݅. Assume, for example, that the collec-
tive agreement is that options 5 and 6 are both better than option 8 in Fig. 3. In such a case, knowing 
the agreement on option 8 makes it likely that options 5 and 6 can be ruled out as requiring further 
agreement to identify them as definitely in the robust portfolio. In this example, ݃ଵሺ8ሻ ൌ 6.  
As a tie-breaker, the distance between the borderline ratio and the nearest end of the option’s ratio bar, 
i.e. 
݃஻ሺ݅ሻ ൌ ൜					minሼ|߮ െ ݎ௜|	, |̅ݎ௜ െ ߮|ሽ 			,		߮ ∈ ሾݎ௜, ̅ݎ௜ሿ	െminሼ|߮ െ ݎ௜|	, |̅ݎ௜ െ ߮|ሽ 			,		߮ ∉ ሾݎ௜, ̅ݎ௜ሿ 	,	
is used. If ݅’s ratio bar does not intersect the borderline ratio, ݃஻ሺ݅ሻ	obtains a negative value. The larger 
the ݃஻ of an option, the less likely it is that the group can avoid some further agreement on the option’s 
score. In Fig. 3, the ݃஻ measure recommends option 1 next. 
The next option to be discussed by the group is again chosen using the lexicographic rule 
argmax
௜∈ூ
݃஺ሺ݅ሻ ≫ argmax௜∈ூ ݃஻ሺ݅ሻ	. 
It should be noted that the two measures for the Value of Agreement described in this paper work only 
for the basic PDA problem. Model extensions, such as incomplete cost information, options that cannot 
be independently chosen or an additional constraint on the maximum number of options in the portfolio 
would require different measures for the Value of Agreement. 
6 Extension to weights  
In this section, we adapt the previously developed measures for the Value of Agreement to SWING 
weighting with incomplete weight information. The value score information ݒ௜௝ is assumed to be com-
plete in the following calculations and assessors ݇ only appraise the weights ݓ௝௞ for all criteria ݆ individ-
ually. We also assume that the popular SWING weighting method (Edwards & Barron 1994, Mustajoki 
et al. 2005, von Winterfeldt & Edwards 1986) is employed and that the decision making group jointly 
agrees on a reference criterion as a first step. A fixed, non-normalised weight (e.g. 100 points) is as-
signed to reference criterion ݆௥ what establishes a linear scale of measurement. Each participant as-
signs non-normalised individual weights ݓ෥௝௞ to all other criteria ݆ ∈ ܬ\ሼ݆௥	ሽ, reflecting their importance 
relative to the reference criterion. The resulting non-normalised weight ranges span from ݓ෥௝ ൌmin௞൛ݓ෥௝௞ൟ to ݓ෥௝ ൌ max௞൛ݓ෥௝௞ൟ within which the group seeks actual agreements ݓ෥௝௔. Since the non-
normalised individual weights	ݓ෥௝௞ and the actual agreements	ݓ෥௝௔ are all based on the same scale of 
measurement, established by the reference criterion ݆௥, the Value of Agreement for SWING weights 
can be computed in a similar method as for scores. 
The weight ranges ൣݓ෥௝, ݓ෥௝൧ form a convex hull of feasible weight combinations. To compute the mini-
mum and maximum overall value score of options, only ܵ௪ as the set of extreme points of this convex 
hull is relevant (Hazen 1986, Liesiö et al. 2007). Without loss of generality, it is assumed in the following 
that the weight combinations ൛w୨ൟ୨∈୎ in ܵ௪ are always normalised such that they sum up to 1; i.e. ∑ ݓ௝௝ ൌ 1	∀൛ݓ௝ൟ௝∈௃ ∈ ܵ௪. An option’s overall value score lies between 
௜ܸ ൌ minቐ෍ݓ௝ݒ௜௝	
௝
:	൛ݓ௝ൟ௝∈௃ ∈ ܵ௪ቑ 		and		 തܸ௜ ൌ maxቐ෍ݓ௝ݒ௜௝	
௝
:	൛ݓ௝ൟ௝∈௃ ∈ ܵ௪ቑ	 .	
In the following,	ݓ௝∗ denotes the predicted weight agreement for criterion ݆ derived analogously to sec-
tion 3 and takes the value ݓ௝௔ after a group agreement has been reached. The predicted weights ݓ௝∗ are 
normalised and sum up to 1. 
Since this paper only aims to introduce the new concept Value of Agreement, applications to other 
weight elicitation methods are not explored further. For instance, applying the Value of Agreement to 
the AHP (Saaty 1990) would require prioritising the elicitation of weight ratio pairs and addressing the 
issue of inconsistencies. For the point assignment method (Nutt 1980), the fact that the actual agreed-
upon weights must add up to a constant sum (e.g. 100 points) and therefore cannot be elicited inde-
pendently from each other poses a challenge to the feasibility of applying the Value of Agreement con-
cept. Finally, if the decision makers choose to structure a larger number of criteria in a value tree 
(Keeney & Raiffa 1976), any Value of Agreement measure would have to take into account the interde-
pendencies of the weights on different hierarchy levels.  
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6.1 Preference programming 
As a range-based strict dominance rule, we use the linear programming approach from Hannan (1981) 
for the MCDA case and the dynamic programming approach from Liesiö et al. (2007)5 for the PDA 
case. The ordinal-based weak dominance rule for weights ݓ௝ is analogous to value scores ݒ௜௝ (see sec-
tion 2). 
6.2 MCDA  
The heuristic choice for the borderline ߮ is max௜൛∑ ݓ௝∗ݒ௜௝௝ ൟ. Let ൣ ௜ܸ#௝, തܸ௜#௝൧ be the overall score range of 
option ݅ ∈ ܫ after having learnt that criterion ݆ takes the predicted weight ݓ௝∗ and having applied the ordi-
nal-based weak dominance rule. The first measure for the Value of Agreement, 
݃஺ሺ݆ሻ ൌ |ܫ| െ ห	൛݅ ∈ ܫ: ߮ ∈ ൫ ௜ܸ#௝, തܸ௜#௝൯ൟ	ห	,	
counts the number of options whose upper bounds are still larger than the heuristic choice after assum-
ing ݓ௝ ൌ ݓ௝∗. In general, ݃஺ favours ‘high impact’ criteria ݆ with a large normalised weight span ݓ௝ െ ݓ௝ 
and large variance Var௜ሼݒ௜௝ሽ among its criterion scores. Using 
݃஻ሺ݆ሻ ൌ max௜ ൛ തܸ௜
#௝ െ ߮ൟ		
as a tie-breaker, the lexicographic rule for selecting the next criterion to be discussed by the group is 
argmax
௝∈௃
݃஺ሺ݆ሻ ≫ argmax௝∈௃ ݃஻ሺ݆ሻ	. 
6.3 PDA 
The borderline value-for-money ratio ߮ is computed as described in section 5 using ௜ܸ∗ ൌ ∑ ݓ௝∗ݒ௜௝௝  as 
the predicted agreement. ൣ ௜ܸ#௝, തܸ௜#௝൧ is the updated overall score range after assuming ݓ௝ ൌ ݓ௝∗. The first 
measure for the Value of Agreement is 
݃஺ሺ݆ሻ ൌ |ܫ| െ ฬ	൜݅ ∈ ܫ ∶ ߮ ∈ ൤௏೔
#ೕ
௖೔ ,
௏ഥ೔#ೕ
௖೔ ൨ൠ	ฬ	,	
again favouring ‘high impact’ criteria. The normalised weight range is used as a tie-breaker; i.e.	
݃஻ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ݓ௝ െ ݓ௝.	
Again, the lexicographic rule  
argmax
௝∈௃
݃஺ሺ݆ሻ ≫ argmax௝∈௃ ݃஻ሺ݆ሻ 
is used to choose the next criterion to be discussed by the group. 
7 Computer simulation 
7.1 Test dataset 
Several authors (e.g. Keisler 2004, Mustajoki et al. 2005, Salo & Hämäläinen 2001, Vetschera et al. 
2014) have previously deployed extensive computer simulation as a means to test ideas on preference 
programming and value of information. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed measures for 
the Value of Agreement, a large test dataset with 360 instances was generated (see Table 2 and Sup-
plementary Material A). The dataset comprises 20 instances for each possible combination of number 
of options, score distribution, weight distribution and cost distribution as provided in Table 2.  
The group members’ individual appraisals ݒ௜௝௞ are constructed as follows: 
 Two participants ݇ଵ ∈ ܭ and ݇ଶ ∈ ܭ are always randomly chosen and are assigned the upper and 
lower criterion score bound; i.e. ݒ௜௝௞భ ൌ ݒ௜௝ and ݒ	௜௝௞మ ൌ ̅ݒ௜௝. 
 ݒ௜௝௞ is normally distributed with ࣨ൬௩೔ೕା௩ത೔ೕଶ , ቀ
௩೔ೕା௩ത೔ೕ
଼ ቁ
ଶ൰ for ݇ ∈ ܭ\ሼ݇ଵ, ݇ଶሽ and rounded to the nearest 
integer. If ݒ௜௝௞ ∉ ሾݒ௜௝, ̅ݒ௜௝ሿ, new numbers are generated for it until ݒ௜௝௞ ∈ ሾݒ௜௝, ̅ݒ௜௝ሿ. 
The group members’ actual agreements ݒ௜௝௔  are modelled by two different distributions A1 and A2. The 
more predictable median-focused distribution A1 is triangular with ܶሺݒ௜௝, ݒ௜௝∗ , ̅ݒ௜௝ሻ. If the originally predict-
ed agreement ݒ௜௝∗  is smaller than ݒ௜௝ or larger than ̅ݒ௜௝ due to bound tightening, it takes the value of the 
bound ݒ௜௝ or ̅ݒ௜௝, respectively. The less predictable distribution A2 is uniform with ܷሺݒ௜௝, ̅ݒ௜௝ሻ. For each 
combination of properties from Table 2, 10 instances receive actual agreement scores according to A1 
and the other 10 according to A2. Starting with ݒଵଵ, the actual agreement scores ݒ௜௝௔  are computed one 
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after the other. After every assignment of a new actual agreement score ݒ௜௝௔ , the feasible ranges 
[ݒ௜ᇲ௝̅ݒ௜ᇲ௝ሿ for all still non-précised scores are tightened as described in section 2. After full actual agree-
ment ௜ܸ௔ about a further option ݅ is constructed, the ranges ሾ ௜ܸᇲ , തܸ௜ᇲሿ of all still non-précised options are 
tightened as described in section 2. If ௜ܸ௔ is outside the tightened score ranges for option ݅, the whole 
procedure is restarted from ݒଵଵ௔ . The actual weight agreement ݓ௝௔ is modelled analogously. 
7.2 Comparison measures 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed measure for the Value of Agreement, we compare it with 
the simple rules of MaxRange and Random. The MaxRange rule (cf. Hämäläinen & Pöyhönen 1996, 
Salo & Hämäläinen 1995) enquires the precise actual agreement of the option (criterion) with the great-
est current score range ሾ ௜ܸ , തܸ௜ሿ (weight range ሾݓ௝, ݓ௝ሿ) until the robust option or portfolio is elicited. The 
Random rule retrieves the precise actual agreement for a randomly chosen option (criterion) for which 
௜ܸ௔ (ݓ௝௔) has not yet been revealed. Preference programming6 is applied for both rules after every single 
actual agreement to exclude options that do not require further preference elicitation. 
By enumerating all feasible elicitation orders, it is possible to compute a lower bound for the number of 
required elicitations for each test instance. This lower bound could always be reached if one knew the 
participants’ actual agreements in advance. As the number of criteria is small in the test dataset (|ܬ| ൌ
5), a full enumeration can be performed for all instances with incomplete weight information. Designing 
a branch-and-bound enumeration algorithm to compute the lower bound efficiently for all instances with 
incomplete score information might be possible, but beyond the scope of this paper. 
7.3 Results 
The test algorithm always selects the option or criterion with the greatest Value of Agreement, reveals 
its modelled actual group agreement, and applies preference programming6 on the new situation. The 
median is used as predicted agreement for scores and weights. Tables 3 to 6 show the results for the 
test dataset. 
In the MCDA case, the Value of Agreement rule on average reduces the number of option (criterion) 
elicitations statistically significantly by 50% (8%) and 45% (19%) compared to the MaxRange and the 
Random rules, respectively. For incomplete score information, MaxRange consistently ignores options 
with small ranges on the right-hand side of the value score chart despite the fact that these are more 
likely to be the robust option. Therefore, the Random rule outperforms the MaxRange rule. In the PDA 
case, the Value of Agreement rule on average decreases the number of inspected options (criteria) sta-
tistically significantly by 41% (2%) and 47% (12%) relative to the MaxRange and the Random rules, 
respectively. 
Table 2 
Properties of test dataset. 
    
  |ܭ| 8  
     
     
  |ܫ| 25, 50 and 100  
      
      
 
ݓ௝ 
 
W0: 5 criteria with random weights ݓሷ௝ so that ∑ ݓሷ௝௝ ൌ 1 and ݓ௝ ൌ ݓሷ௝ ൌ ݓഥ௝ ∀݆ (complete weight information) 
W1: 5 criteria with random weights ݓሷ௝ so that ∑ ݓሷ௝௝ ൌ 1. ݓ௜ and ݓഥ௝ take with equal probability one of the following five 
value pairs: ݓ௝ ൅ 0.02 ൌ ݓሷ௝ ൌ ݓഥ௝ െ 0.03; ݓ௝ ൅ 0.05 ൌ ݓሷ௝ ൌ ݓഥ௝ െ 0.05; ݓ௝ ൅ 0.07 ൌ ݓሷ௝ ൌ ݓഥ௝ െ 0.08; ݓ௝ ൅ 0.1 ൌ ݓሷ௝ ൌ ݓഥ௝ െ 0.1; 
and ݓ௝ ൅ 0.12 ൌ ݓሷ௝ 	ൌ ݓഥ௝ െ 0.13. 
 
      
      
 
ݒ௜௝ 
  
V0: ݒ௜௝~ܷሺ0,100ሻ and ݒ௜௝ ൌ ̅ݒ௜௝          ∀݅, ݆ (complete score information) 
V1: ݒ௜௝~ܷሺ0,95ሻ   and ݒ௜௝ ൅ 5 ൌ ̅ݒ௜௝    in 25% of the cases 
       ݒ௜௝~ܷሺ0,90ሻ   and ݒ௜௝ ൅ 10 ൌ ̅ݒ௜௝  in 25% of the cases  
       ݒ௜௝~ܷሺ0,85ሻ   and ݒ௜௝ ൅ 15 ൌ ̅ݒ௜௝  in 25% of the cases 
       ݒ௜௝~ܷሺ0,80ሻ   and ݒ௜௝ ൅ 20 ൌ ̅ݒ௜௝  in 25% of the cases 
V2: ݒ௜௝~ܷሺ0,90ሻ   and ݒ௜௝ ൅ 10 ൌ ̅ݒ௜௝  in 25% of the cases 
       ݒ௜௝~ܷሺ0,80ሻ   and ݒ௜௝ ൅ 20 ൌ ̅ݒ௜௝  in 25% of the cases 
       ݒ௜௝~ܷሺ0,70ሻ   and ݒ௜௝ ൅ 30 ൌ ̅ݒ௜௝  in 25% of the cases 
       ݒ௜௝~ܷሺ0,60ሻ   and ݒ௜௝ ൅ 40 ൌ ̅ݒ௜௝  in 25% of the cases 
 
       
      
 
ܿ௜ 
 
 
Let ݎ௜ ൌ ଵ௖೔ᇲ ∑ ݓ௝
௩೔ೕା௩ത೔ೕ	
ଶ௝  be the average value-for-money ratio of option ݅ and ܷሺ ሻ a uniform distribution, then 
C1: ݎ௜~ܷሺ1,2.5ሻ	∀݅  
C2: ݎ௜~ܷሺ1,10ሻ	∀݅. 
The resulting ܿ௜ᇱ from settings C1 and C2 are normalised to ܿ௜ so that ∑ ܿ௜௜ ൌ 2,500. ܤ ൌ 1,000 is assumed as the budget for 
all problem instances. 
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The results underscore that a more accurate prediction of the agreed value score improves the effec-
tiveness of the Value of Agreement rule. For A2 instances, the Value of Agreement rule decreases the 
number of required option agreements by 41% in the MCDA and by 43% in the PDA case, compared to 
the Random rule; but for A1 instances, these numbers rise to 49% in the MCDA and 51% in the PDA 
case. Overall, the Value of Agreement measure seems to make the greatest gains by looking for op-
tions that trigger ordinal-based weak dominance rules, have a large score range and are not too far 
away from the true borderline ߮. The gains from a more precise prediction of the agreement (i.e. chang-
ing from A1 to A2 instances) were much smaller. This is because prediction errors are limited by the 
scores’ upper and lower bounds, what means that the predicted borderline ො߮ should even for less accu-
rate predictions of the agreed scores not be located too far from the unknown true borderline ߮ in most 
cases.  
Increasing the score ranges from setting V1 to V2 leads to 66% and 33% more required option agree-
ments for the MCDA and PDA case, respectively, when using the Value of Agreement rule. This is an 
expected result because the more the participants disagree on the scoring, the longer it should take to 
reach group agreement on the robust option. Decreasing the spread of the options’ value-for-money 
ratios from setting C2 to C1 doubles the average number of required option agreements in the PDA 
case when using the Value of Agreement rule. This result is also less surprising because if all options 
tend to be, on average, more or less equally attractive in terms of their value-for-money ratios, it be-
comes less likely that many options ݅ are dominated or dominating, independent of what actual scores 
ݒ௜௝௔  the group finally agrees on. 
Unlike for incomplete score information, the reduction in required preference elicitations is small for in-
complete weight information—both in percentage and nominal terms. This can be explained by the fact 
that the MaxRange rule already provides solutions near the lower bound. The required number of elici-
tations when using the MaxRange rule is just 29% and 8% higher for the MCDA and the PDA case, re-
Table 3 
Average number of required option agreements ௜ܸ௔ in the MCDA case with Value of Agreement rule (first number), MaxRange rule (sec-
ond number) and Random rule (third number) for the 240 W0 test instances grouped by number of options, value score distribution and 
agreement model. 
     
  V1  V2 
  A1 A2  A1 A2 
25    1.3  |   2.3  |   2.1   1.9  |   3.1  |   2.7    2.4  |    4.6  |    4.7    2.9  |    5.3  |    4.8 
50    1.6  |   3.2  |   2.7   1.6  |   3.1  |   2.4    2.9  |  06.3  |    5.8    3.1  |  07.3  |    6.8 
100    2.0  |   4.3  |   3.9   2.1  |   3.5  |   3.2    2.1  |  07.3  |  06.4    3.3  |  07.7  |    6.3 
      
 
Table 4 
Average number of required option agreements ௜ܸ௔ in the PDA case with Value of Agreement rule (first number), MaxRange rule (sec-
ond number) and Random rule (third number) for the 240 W0 test instances grouped by number of options, value score distribution, cost 
distribution and agreement model. 
     
  V1  V2 
  A1   A2  A1 A2 
25 C1 08.3  |  12.2  |  12.1 08.3  |  10.9  |  11.5    9.3  |  14.2  |  15.5 11.1  |  13.4  |  15.4 
25 C2 04.0  |  04.8  |  05.0 02.2  |  02.8  |  03.3  06.5  |  09.3  |  19.8   4.9  |    7.2  |    7.5 
50 C1 12.7  |  24.8  |  28.0 16.4  |  27.1  |  29.4  15.0  |  27.1  |  29.9 20.5  |  31.9  |  34.8 
50 C2 05.0  |  07.4  |  08.5 08.6  |  12.0  |  13.3    7.9  |  17.4  |  17.2 10.3  |  16.5  |  19.3 
100 C1 17.8  |  49.9  |  57.2 26.7  |  55.5  |  64.0  24.0  |  50.3  |  55.5 31.7  |  53.3  |  61.9 
100 C2 09.8  |  26.7  |  32.3 11.1  |  24.2  |  26.7  10.7  |  31.5  |  35.6 21.3  |  37.8  |  46.7 
      
 
Table 5 
Average number of required criterion agreements 
ݓ௝௔	in the MCDA case for the lower bound (first num-
ber), with the Value of Agreement rule (second num-
ber), with the MaxRange rule (third number) and with 
the Random rule (fourth number) for the 120 V0-W1 
test instances grouped by number of options and 
agreement model. 
 
  
 A1 A2 
25 01.9 | 02.2 | 02.2 | 02.9 01.9 | 02.2 | 02.5 | 02.9
50 01.3 | 01.8 | 01.8 | 01.9 01.6 | 01.9 | 02.3 | 02.3
100 01.5 | 01.7 | 01.8 | 02.5 02.0 | 02.4 | 02.6 | 02.4
   
 
 Table 6 
Average number of required criterion agreements ݓ௝௔ in the PDA case for 
the lower bound (first number), with the Value of Agreement rule (second 
number), with the MaxRange rule (third number) and with the Random rule 
(fourth number) for the 120 V0-W1 test instances grouped by number of 
options, cost distribution and agreement model.  
 
  A1  A2 
25 C1 03.3 | 03.4 | 03.4 | 04.3 03.6 | y3.8 | 03.9 | 04.0 
25 C2 02.3 | 02.7 | 02.6 | 03.3 02.6 | 03.1 | 03.1 | 03.2 
50 C1 03.9 | 04.2 | 04.5 | 04.6 04.0 | 04.1 | 04.2 | 04.9 
50 C2 02.6 | 03.1 | 03.2 | 04.0 03.1 | 03.5 | 03.6 | 04.0 
100 C1 04.4 | 04.5 | 04.5 | 05.0 04.6 | 04.6 | 04.7 | 04.8 
100 C2 04.3 | 04.3 | 04.4 | 04.8 03.9 | y3.9 | 04.1 | 04.7 
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spectively, as compared to the lower bound. The Value of Agreement rule reduces this deviation from 
the lower bound to 19% and 6%, respectively. 
8 Application to recruitment 
Ennovators Ltd. is a medium size e-commerce brand developer with approximately 100 employees in 
its London office. In summer 2015, the company’s marketing department advertised to recruit a pricing 
analyst. The recruitment exercise was conducted by a panel consisting of the head of e-commerce, a 
marketing manager and a pricing analyst. A decision analysis model informed the recruitment process.  
Several real-world applications of decision analysis to the recruitment process have been previously 
reported in the literature. Most publications showcase a fuzzy approach (e.g. Afshari et al. 2013, 
Petrovic‐Lazarevic 2001, Polychroniou & Giannikos 2009); often combined with other techniques such 
as AHP (Celik et al. 2009, Khosla et al. 2009), ANP (Kabak et al. 2012) and TOPSIS (Kelemenis & 
Askounis 2010, Wang et al. 2006). Using fuzzy sets, the authors seek to consider the uncertainties as-
sociated with appraising candidates. Stal-Le Cardinal et al. (2011) applied Electre Tri to select a portfo-
lio of students for university admission. Gibney & Shang (2007) used AHP for recruiting the dean of a 
business school. Finally, Gardiner & Armstrong-Wright (2000) provided detailed insights into developing 
a simple MDCA model for faculty recruitment in view of anti-discrimination laws. In line with Barclay 
(2001), we could not find evidence in the literature showing that decision analysis is used much in 
practice to inform the recruitment process. Among other reasons (Jessop 2004), we argue that the 
complexity of the elicitation process in many previous case studies severely hinders the uptake by prac-
titioners (cf. Belton & Stewart 2002, Keeney & von Winterfeldt 2007). Therefore, it was our aim to de-
sign a user-friendly, time-efficient and rigorous decision analysis approach for the Ennovators’ recruit-
ment process. 
As the initial step of the Ennovators’ recruitment process, the panel jointly constructed the decision 
model by agreeing on criteria, value scales and weights. Based on the job description and the compa-
ny’s core behavioural values, ‘analytics software’, ‘numerical skills’, ‘personality fit’, ‘pricing experience’ 
and ‘self-motivation’ were chosen as the assessment criteria. For each criterion, a candidate’s minimum 
required performance level in order to be considered for the job was assigned a value score of 0 points 
and 100 points for the maximum desired performance level. Verbal descriptions of the performance 
levels were assigned to the value score points of 25, 50 and 75 for each criterion using the bi-section 
method (Fishburn 1967). The resulting value scales are shown in Table 8. Note that the verbal descrip-
tions of the five equal-distanced points on the value scales only serve as a reference, and panel mem-
bers were free to assess candidates with any other value score between 0 and 100 for a particular crite-
rion. All five criteria are intangible in the sense that a candidate’s precise value score for a criterion de-
pends on the assessors’ subjective interpretations of CV, cover letter and interview performance based 
on the assessors’ knowledge and experience. Due to the diversity of job candidates, it is not practical to 
construct more precise value scales (Gardiner & Armstrong-Wright 2000). Criteria trade-offs were as-
sessed using the SWING weighting method (Edwards & Barron 1994, von Winterfeldt & Edwards 1986) 
which compares the value of improvement from 0 to 100 for each criterion. The recruitment process 
takes the form of a portfolio decision analysis problem with a predetermined number of candidates be-
ing invited to the next interview round (the budget) and each interview causing fixed costs of 1. 
An easy-to-use software was developed to support preference programming under incomplete score 
information for portfolio decision analysis (freely available from Supplementary Material B). Fig. 5 
shows a screenshot of the software’s window for the value-for-money chart from the case study. Candi-
dates who will not and will definitely be invited for an interview are displayed on the bottom left and 
right, respectively. The Value of Agreement concept suggests discussing Marco next, whose value 
score bar7 is highlighted. Double-clicking on the name opens a new window in which the decision mak-
ers can see the score ranges ሾݒ௜௝̅ݒ௜௝ሿ	and they can type in their jointly-agreed scores ݒ௜௝௔   for Marco.  The 
software tool allows the choice between the social judgement scheme (used in this case study) and the 
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VOGA’s candidate review consisted of four steps. In step 1, HR screened the 87 incoming applications 
and excluded 47 (e.g. no proper cover letter, requiring work permit, no university degree, obvious  
Table 7 
Assessment criteria with weights in parenthesis and value scale.  
 
  
Analytics software (21%) 
100_ Advanced skills in Excel (e.g. pivot tables, conditional format-
ting) AND considerable experience in VBA AND experience in 
Google Analytics AND considerable experience in at least 
one other relevant analytics tool (e.g. data mining software, 
R, SQL, computer programming) 
75_ Advanced skills in Excel AND experience in VBA AND expe-
rience in at least one other relevant analytics tools 
50_ Advanced skills in Excel AND some experience in VBA  
25_ Advanced skills in Excel 
0_ Basic skills in Excel (e.g. chart building, cell functions) 
Numerical skills (24%) 
100_ Degree in a highly numerical subject (e.g. math, science, 
finance, economics) AND at least one year’s work experience 
in an analyst role 
75_ Degree in a highly numerical subject OR at least one year’s 
work experience in an analyst role 
50_ Degree in business administration, marketing or a related 
field OR some experience in applying numerical skills in a 
work environment 
25_ Degree which includes some numerical modules (e.g. psy-
chology) 
0_ Non-numerical university degree 
Personality fit8 (15%): Creative, good command over English, 
experience working at a SME, open-minded, outgoing, pro-active, 
sense of humour 
100_ Candidate is expected to fit perfectly into the culture of Enno-
vators AND most of the staff are very much expected to like 
to work with the candidate (evidence to look for: previous 
work experience of dealing with people, examples of behav-
iour provided in cover letter and interview, and verbal and 
non-verbal communication in the interview) 
75_ Candidate is expected to fit well into the culture of Ennovators 
with some minor limitations (e.g. minor language barriers, no 
evidence of dealing successful with conflicts, a bit shy) 
50_ Candidate is not expected to contribute positively or negative-
ly to Ennovators’ working environment AND candidate is 
unlikely to cause any communication or behavioural problems
25_ Other employees are expected to be able to work together 
with the candidate without any major issues AND candidate 
has room for improving communication and social interac-
tions (e.g. very shy, less efficient communication) 
0_ Staff at Ennovators could work with the candidate (e.g. rather 
poor English, rather unskilled communicator, slightly arro-
gant) 
 
Pricing experience (29%) 
100_Experienced in developing pricing models or strategies 
75_Familiar with pricing through work experience 
50_Good understanding of pricing theory from university 
25_Some basic understanding of pricing (e.g. through marketing 
modules at university) 
0_No previous knowledge 
 
Self-motivated and willingness to learn (12%): Career progres-
sion, extracurricular activities, good grades, interest in job 
100_Top grades at university (e.g. distinction) AND strong career 
progression (if applicable) AND further training (e.g. master’s, 
diplomas, languages, internships, volunteering) AND strong 
examples of work ethos in the cover letter or interview AND
shows a satisfactory level of interest in job vacancy 
75_Good grades (e.g. merit) AND (strong career progression OR
further training) AND very good examples of work ethos AND
shows a satisfactory level of interest in job vacancy 
50_(Acceptable career progression OR some further training) 
AND good examples of work ethos AND shows a satisfactory 
level of interest in job vacancy 
25_Poor grades (e.g. pass) AND good examples of work ethos 
AND shows a satisfactory level of interest in job vacancy  
0_Shows a satisfactory level of interest in job vacancy 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Screenshot of value-for-money chart from the first group discussion. Candidate names have been changed. 
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median to predict the agreed value score. To avoid biasing the decision makers, the software’s value-
for-money chart does not reveal the predicted scores ௜ܸ∗ to the participants. 
Ennovators’ candidate review consisted of four steps. In step one, HR screened the 87 incoming appli-
cations and excluded 47 (e.g. no proper cover letter, requiring work permit, no university degree, obvi-
ous misfits). In step two, each panel member scored the remaining 40 applications individually using 
the agreed value scales in Table 7. In a subsequent one-hour group discussion, the panel members 
sought the necessary agreement on the scores to select the 10 candidates who should be invited to an 
interview (individual and agreed value scores are available in Supplementary Material C). The discus-
sion was facilitated by a decision analyst who also entered the agreed scores into the software tool. At 
no point during the discussion did the panel members have a particular preference on which candi-
date’s score agreement should be sought next, and therefore they always followed the suggestion 
made by the software tool. In step three, nine interviews were held soon afterwards (one candidate sent 
their apologies) and each panel member individually updated their previous scorings. In the subsequent 
group discussion, the panel members used the software tool to agree on the three candidates to be in-
vited to the final round on the following day; this discussion was however conducted without the support 
from a decision analyst. In step four, a problem-solving interview was held and the panel members up-
dated their previous individual scorings of the candidates before discussing them as a group. The soft-
ware tool was not employed in step four because the panel required a full ranking of the three candi-
dates in case the best one rejected the job offer. Overall, the panel members were confident that they 
made the job offer to the best candidate, which meant that the decision model was requisite (Phillips 
1984).  
The case study revealed two technical problems that were not relevant in the computer simulation. The 
first problem involves candidates on whom the panel members disagree with regards to their individual 
scorings; i.e. whether or not a particular candidate meets the minimum required performance level for a 
particular criterion. If a panel member ݇ believes that a candidate ݅ does not meet the minimum ex-
pected performance levels in criterion ݆, they would choose a prohibitive high value score of ݒ௜௝௞ ൌെ300 such that candidate ݅ can practically never become a ‘dominating option’ unless all the panel 
members jointly agree on a better score for ݒ௜௝௔  following a group discussion. The second problem en-
tails situations where the group agrees on a value score ݒ௜௝௔  for option ݅ in criterion ݆ which is outside its 
range ሾݒ௜௝, ̅ݒ௜௝ሿ. This situation occurred once in the case study when none of the panel members real-
ised before the group discussion that one candidate’s personality fit was actually very poor. Some pre-
viously determined dominance relations may become invalid if the agreed value score of ݒ௜௝௔  lies outside 
the range ሾݒ௜௝̅ݒ௜௝ሿ—thus, options previously identified as dominated or dominating need to be reconsid-
ered. In cases where an option ݅’s agreed value score on a particular criterion ݆ lies outside its original 
value score range, ݒ௜௝௞ takes the value ݒ௜௝௔  for all participants ݇ and the preference programme is re-
initialised, beginning with the complete original set of options. 
Reflecting on the recruitment process, the panel members highlighted that the use of decision analysis 
forced them to properly assess candidates against all job requirements and to try to avoid becoming 
biased by individual aspects (see also Gardiner & Armstrong-Wright 2000, Gibney & Shang 2007). Alt-
hough considerably more time-consuming, the panel members agreed that using proper multi-criteria 
decision models should lead to better and more transparent recruitment decisions. Since scoring mod-
els (in various forms and shapes) are commonly used in a business environment, the panel members 
readily grasped and accepted the core elements of the developed decision model (additive value func-
tion, bisection method, and SWING weighting). 
The panel members also believed that the often-employed aggregation method to reach consensus in 
multi-criteria group decision making would have been inappropriate in this case study. As mentioned in 
the introduction section of this paper, the aggregation method computes a proposed aggregate ݒ௜௝௣  
based on group members’ individual scores ݒ௜௝௞ and automatically decides on the group’s preferred 
portfolio using the scores ݒ௜௝௣ . But several times, only one panel member ݇ᇱ made a particular observa-
tion about a candidate (e.g. noticing an important but hidden detail in the CV or knowing a particular 
analytics software that the candidate mentioned) which led to a rather extreme criterion score ݒ௜௝௞ᇲ; 
however, this turned out to be justified in the subsequent group discussion in the sense that the actually 
agreed score ݒ௜௝௔  was close to ݒ௜௝௞ᇲ and far from the predicted score ݒ௜௝∗ . Thus, calculating the preferred 
candidate portfolio based on automatically calculated aggregates could have led to a poor recruitment 
decision in this case study. On the other hand, it would not have been practically feasible to discuss all 
40 applications one-by-one due to time constraints. Therefore, preference programming offered a way 
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to retain valuable individual scores by not settling for automatic aggregates but also keeping the deci-
sion problem at a practically manageable size. In this context, the Value of Agreement can be seen as 
a useful tool to make preference programming more effective but also more user-friendly in situations 
where a skilled facilitator is not present. 
9 Conclusion 
Deciding on which option a group should discuss next in a decision analysis workshop following indi-
vidual option appraisals has always involved only informed guess-work. This paper introduced the Val-
ue of Agreement concept to measure for which options it is particularly worth seeking further group 
agreement in order to make a robust group decision quickly. An extensive computer simulation and a 
case study demonstrated the usefulness of the proposed Value of Agreement concept. In addition, we 
provided a free software programme to allow practitioners and researchers to readily employ prefer-
ence programming and the Value of Agreement for standard portfolio decision analysis. 
The Value of Agreement concept is primarily developed for decision problems where the number of op-
tions is large, but the available time to seek group agreement is rather limited. Practical examples in-
clude recurring decision problems such as hiring processes, maintenance prioritisations, project ten-
ders, credit approvals and research funding decisions. As most decision problems are assessed with 
only a few criteria, we are less convinced of the practical relevance of applying the Value of Agreement 
to weights. Furthermore, by comparing the results for three different prioritisation rules (Value of 
Agreement, MaxRange and Random) with the theoretical lower bound, the possibilities for reducing the 
number of required elicitations were shown to be limited for incomplete weight information.  
We broadly defined the Value of Agreement as an estimate for the impact of eliciting additional prefer-
ence information on the time requirements of a decision analysis workshop. The present paper applies 
the new concept only to a specific workshop design and problem formulation. Therefore, there is scope 
for more research. First, the present paper assumes that the group always seeks maximal agreement 
on an option’s value score ௜ܸ before discussing the next option. Future work may advocate a more flex-
ible approach of switching between discussing the individual criterion value scores ݒ௜௝ from different 
options. In this case, the Value of Agreement concept could be used to provide guidance on which cri-
terion value scores ݒ௜௝ seeking further agreement is particularly worthwhile and when it might be advis-
able to move on to the next option without having reached full agreement on the option’s value score ௜ܸ. 
Thereby facilitators need to be mindful of the additional cognitive burden to participants that might be 
imposed by the frequent switching of the discussed option. Second, the present paper assumes that a 
group is prepared to discard an option only if it is strictly dominated. However, in some cases, the max-
imum loss of value in discarding a particular option may be so small that it would not be worth the deci-
sion making group’s time (Salo & Hämäläinen 2010). Thus, future applications of the Value of Agree-
ment concept might explicitly consider the costs of decision makers’ time when proposing the next op-
tion for group discussion. Ultimately, the Value of Agreement concept might be used to seek group 
consensus on preference assessments until the maximum loss of value of the decision problem has 
been reduced to a level that the group feels comfortable with. The final decision could be made later by 
using the aggregation method mentioned in the introduction section, by applying decision rules for in-
complete preferences such as minimax regret or by delegating the final decision to particular individuals 
for further considerations. Third, the present paper assumes that decision makers express their prefer-
ences numerically. Alternatively, the Value of Agreement concept can also be applied to qualitative 
preference judgements (e.g. Fasolo & Bana e Costa 2014). Those qualitative judgements can be in the 
form of preference classes (e.g. ‘very good’), ordinal preference relations (e.g. ‘X belongs to the 5 best 
options’) or intensity preferences (e.g. ‘weakly preferred’). A behind-the-scenes model translates the 
qualitative judgements into incomplete preference information (e.g. Bana e Costa & Vansnick 1994, 
Punkka & Salo 2013) and solves the resulting preference programme. Again, the question is where the 
decision maker should begin to make their qualitative judgements more precise. Fourth, the present 
paper applies the Value of Agreement concept only to SWING weighting. If future research can demon-
strate that the Value of Agreement is indeed practically useful for weights, the adaption of this concept 
to other weight-elicitation methods would be an obvious research opportunity. Fifth, the present paper 
only addresses a basic PDA formulation. Applications of the Value of Agreement concept to more gen-
eral PDA cases would be welcomed. 
Future work may also develop measures for the Value of Agreement in a more systematic way than in 
this paper. Better heuristic choices for the predicted score of the robust option in the MCDA case and 
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better usage of the knapsack problem characteristic in the PDA case would be desirable. It is also pos-
sible to examine whether there are benefits from recommending the next option for group discussion 
based on more complex option agreement scenarios. For instance, a decision tree could be used to 
model how the choice for the next option is influenced by which options the group might select after-
wards and what happens if the group agreement deviates from the prediction. Finally, a more axiomatic 
approach to the constructions of measures for the Value of Agreement, with proven properties of the 
solution quality, would be of theoretical interest. 
As a final point, it should not be concluded from this paper that the group must always mechanically 
attempt to find full agreement on the option with the greatest Value of Agreement. Sometimes there are 
options for which agreement can be found very easily or those on which the participants have funda-
mentally different perspectives (Mustajoki & Hämäläinen 2005). Dias (2007) argues that the participants 
should first focus on the less difficult elicitation questions to allow them to learn more about the used 
method and their preferences before tackling the difficult ones. One may also want to consider that 
gaining almost no progress in finding agreement from the start can endanger the ‘emotional life’ 
(Phillips & Phillips 1993) of the group and thus, the success of the workshop. Therefore a skilled facilita-
tor should balance the recommendations prescribed by the Value of Agreement and the need to tackle 
easy tasks first. 
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Endnotes 
1_Following their argument, options with a core index of around 0.5 should probably be examined first. 
2 As an alternative to Hazen’s strict dominance rule, one may apply a quasi-dominance rule instead (Dias & Climaco 2005). In this case, 
an option ݅∗ is defined as robust if no other option ݅ ∈ ܫ\ሼ݅∗ሽ with an upper bound തܸ௜ exceeding the lower bound ௜ܸ∗ of option ݅∗ by more 
than a given tolerance value ߝ exists. Quasi-dominance allows taking into account that the maximum loss of value the group could suf-
fer when choosing option ݅∗ may be too small to justify letting the decision making group convene for longer (Salo & Hämäläinen 
2010). Quasi-dominance would add more complexity to the decision model and therefore is not discussed further in this paper. 
3_When the heuristic choice ො߮ takes the value of an already agreed overall value score of an option ݏ (i.e. ො߮ ൌ ௦ܸ௔), the upper bounds of 
some other options ݐ might be tightened such that തܸ௧ ൌ ௦ܸ௔ ൌ ො߮. Those options ݐ are highly unlikely to be identified as robust after fur-
ther preference elicitation. Therefore, the open interval ൫ ௜ܸᇲ#௜, തܸ௜ᇲ#௜൯ is used for ݃஺ሺ݅ሻ in the MCDA case so that options ݐ are counted as 
practically dominated. 
4_The table below provides a numerical illustration for the example depicted in Fig. 2. Three participants assess four options on two 
criteria and the median is used to predict the group’s agreement. The borderline takes the value ො߮ ൌ max௜ሼ ௜ܸ∗ሽ ൌ 66. Furthermore, as 
an additional notation, let ̅ݒ௜ᇲ௝#௜  be the upper bound of ݒ௜ᇲ௝ when assuming that ݒ௜௝ takes the predicted value ݒ௜௝∗ .  
   
 Criterion 1 (ݓଵ ൌ 0.5)  Criterion 2 (ݓଶ ൌ 0.5)     
Participant 1 Participant 2 Participant 3  Participant 1 Participant 2 Participant 3  ௜ܸ തܸ௜ ௜ܸ∗ 
Option 1 6 94 68  64 100 50  28 97 66 
Option 2 0 10 90  0 36 62  0 76 23 
Option 3 43 12 64  50 4 47  8 57 45 
Option 4 38 78 84  36 38 64  37 74 58 
 
It is shown in the following that the measure ݃஺ for the Value Agreement of option 4 takes the value of 1. Option 4 dominates option 2 
on criterion 2 because all three participants ݇ assigned a higher score to ݒସଶ௞ than to ݒଶଶ௞. Using the median, the predicted score for 
option 4 on criterion 2 is ݒସଶ∗ ൌ 38, which becomes the upper bound for option 2 on criterion 2; i.e. ݒଶଶ#ସ ൌ 38. ݒଶଵ#ସ ൌ ݒଶଵ ൌ 90 because 
option 4 does not dominate option 2 on criterion 1. It follows that the upper bound for option 2, when assuming the predicted agree-
ment for option 4, is തܸଶ#ସ ൌ ݓଵݒଶଵ#ସ ൅ ݓଶݒଶଶ#ସ ൌ 64, which is smaller than the borderline ො߮. The upper bound of option 3 തܸଷ is already 
smaller than ො߮, and തܸସ#ସ ൌ ସܸ∗ ൌ 58 as well. There are no dominance relationships between option 1 and 4, which means തܸଵ#ସ ൌ തܸଵ ൌ97. It follows that only option 1 intersects the borderline when assuming that the group agrees on the predicted scores ݒ௜௝∗  for option 4, 
meaning that ݃஺ሺ4ሻ ൌ 1. 
5_When testing Liesiö et al.’s PDA preference programme (2007) for incomplete weight information, we noticed that their algorithm does 
not identify all dominated portfolios and therewith all dominated options. For instance, it is possible that a portfolio ݌ଵ is dominated by 
portfolio ݌ଶ or ݌ଷ for all feasible weight combinations, but there is always a feasible weight combination such that ݌ଵ is not dominated 
by ݌ଶ and a feasible weight combination such that ݌ଵ is not dominated by ݌ଷ. As Liesiö et al.’s algorithm only uses pairwise compari-
sons of portfolios, it does not recognise that ݌ଵ is actually dominated. To test whether a portfolio ݌ଵ is dominated by any other set of 
portfolios for all feasible weight combinations, one can solve a linear programme with arbitrary objective function where (i) the weights 
are constrained by their upper and lower bounds and (ii) there is a linear constraint for each other’s portfolio such that ݌ଵ is not domi-
nated by this portfolio. If the linear programme has no feasible solution for the weights, there is no feasible weight allocation so that ݌ଵ 
is not dominated—hence ݌ଵ is dominated. 
6_For the PDA case, the preference programme from Liesiö et al. (2007) is given a time limit of 2 seconds. The algorithm is written in 
VB.NET x64 release and ran on a 2.8 GHz processor with 4GB RAM. 
7_As ܿ௜ ൌ 1 for all candidates ݅ ∈ ܫ, the value-for-money ratio bars depicted in Fig. 5 are identical with the candidates’ value score bars ൣ ௜ܸ, തܸ௜൧.  
8_Given the limited information about a candidate’s personality fit before the interview, the panel members agreed to be generous when 
appraising only the candidates’ written applications and scored most participants between 70 and 90 on this criterion in step 2 of the 
recruitment process. 
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